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C. Schock. Koranexegese, Grammatik und Logik. Zum Verhaltnis von ara-
bischer und aristotelischer Urteils-, Konsequenz- und Schlusslehre. Lei-
den: Brill (\Islamic philosophy, theology and science. Texts and studies,"
60), 2005. XIV+416 pp. ISBN 90{04{14588{5.
This book is the revised version of a thesis which was submitted to the
Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Freiburg im Breisgau in Febru-
ary 2002. It oers a new approach to problems of Islamic hermeneutics
and the understanding of Qur-anic exegesis.
It is well known that a central problem of Islamic hermeneutics in
Qur-anic exegesis and in law is that of the indenite pronouns (al-asma-
al-mubhama) and other general statements (al-alfaz. al-,amma), such as:
\Nay, but whoever (man) hath done evil and his sin surroundeth him;
such are rightful owners of the Fire; they will abide therein" (2:81) , or
\As for the thief, both male and female, cut o their hands" (5:38), or
\[. . . ] slay the idolaters" (9:5), or \The evildoers (fujjar) are in hell"
(82:14). The debate on the general expressions and indenite pronouns
goes back to the early time of Islamic theology and law as is attested in
the generation of the Companions (pp. 10{13, 90{94).
With Was.il b. ,At.a- (d. 131/748) and Abu H. anfa (d. 150/767) the
discussion on this matter already reaches a kind of polarity which will
continue to prevail in the history of Islamic theology. Was.il's thought, in
his understanding of \general" and \particular," is based on the extension
of the concept (closer to the Platonic and early Aristotelian tradition),
whereas Abu H. anfa's point of departure is the content of the concept,
its intention; he emphasizes the intentional aspect of the \particular"
corresponding to a \common" in the \particular" (closer to the classical
teaching of Aristotle) (pp. 2{3).
The question of the precedence of an extensional or intentional concep-
tion is not only fundamental for the reaching of judgment by the Islamic
theologians, but also for the concept of faith, as we shall see (pp. 104{111,
on Abu H. anfa; pp. 1l2{179, for the Mu,tazils).
Indeed, if faith (man) comprises the performance of all religious duties
(\acts of obedience," t.a,at) and excludes the sins (\acts of disobedience,"
ma,as.) (Was.il/Mu,tazils), the signication is \extensional"; faith is the
sum of the acts of obedience which are subsumed under faith. But if faith
is knowledge (ma,rifa), inner and outer assent (tas.dq, iqrar) that cannot
be divided and cannot increase or decrease (Murji-a/Abu H. anfa/H. anafs),
then it is understood as intentional and denitional (p. 4).
Both reference elds (Bezugsfelder) already exist in the Aristotelian
writings on logic. Representatives of the extensional comprehension of
concept include Plato's successor Xenocrates (d. 314 BCE), successors
of Aristotle, including perhaps Theophrast (d. ca. 285 BCE) and later
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Themistius (d. 388 CE), and above all the Neoplatonist Porphyrius (d.
ca. 305 CE).
The interpretation of the general Qur-anic expressions and indenite
pronouns became a central issue between the two rationalist schools, the
Mu,tazils and the Murji-s/H. anafs, particularly the controversy on the
understanding of the so-called \threat of punishment verses" (ayat al-
wa,d), and generally speaking the relation between the \promise and
threat" (al-wa,d wa-'l-wa,d). The starting point was not logic, but a
dogmatical controversy.
It should be noticed, however, that \according to the thesis of this
work, the beginnings of the kalam coincide with the inception of the re-
ception of Late Antiquity logic. More explicitly stated, the beginnings
of the reception of Late Antiquity logic are a deciding factor in the new
quality of the controversial dogmatic which is called \dialectic" (kalam),
that is, logic within disputation, in the way that it can also be traced
back to the Aristotelian topics" (p. 14; Schock refers here to Josef van
Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra. Eine
Geschichte des religiosen Denkens im fruhen Islam [Berlin, Walter de
Gruyter, 1991-97], vol. 1, pp. 45{56, henceforth TG).
Schock has tried here \to systematize the doctrines of the Arabic-
speaking and writing Muslim theologians and logicians from dogmatical,
linguistic and logical aspects, and to work out the overlaps and mutual
interferences of koranic exegesis, grammar and logic. Moreover, structural
similarities and convergences, like the similarity between the Mu,tazil and
Stoic doctrine of consequence, do not yet necessarily allow to conclude that
there are dependencies. However, thought patterns like Was.il b. ,At.a-'s
determination of the relation of general to special, or of whole to part, and
Abu H. anfa's denitional determination of `faith', suggest an inuence of
the tradition of Late Antiquity" (pp. 15{16).
It should be noticed that, even if this book follows a chronological
order, each of its seventeen chapters can be read as a unit in itself (chap.
2{17, chap. 1 being the introduction, and chap. 18, the summary and
the conclusions; followed by an English translation of this chapter, pp.
426{39).
In the rst chapter (pp. 18{30), Schock presents Theophrast (d. ca.
285 BCE) and Alexander of Aphrodisias's (d. ca. 200 CE) conception of
the absolute, necessary and possible judgment. It should be recalled that
according the peripatetic logic, the wa,d verses of the Qur-an are unquan-
tied, and assertoric, categoric and conditional/hypothetic judgments, or
statements (akhbar) or premises. A nominal sentence like \The evildoers
(fujjar) are in hell" (82:14) is, according to the view of Ibn al-Muqaa,,
an indenite (muhmal/adioristos) statement, that is unquantied, as-
sertoric (mut.laq/aplo^s), that is \simple" (German schlechtinnig ; Latin
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simpliciter) in regards to time and matter. It is a declaration concern-
ing something actual (German Vorliegendes) (mawjud/uparchon), with-
out modalisation, that is without dierentiation from being necessary or
possible (imkan/endechesthai).
For Farab and Ibn Sna conditional sentences like \Nay, but whoever
hath done evil and his sin surroundeth him; such are rightful owners of
the Fire..." (2:81) have the same status: the conjunction of protasis (an-
tecedent) and apodosis (consequent/trailer) in such sentences is indenite,
like the relation of the subject and the predicate in Qur-an 82:14.
It will be seen in the following chapters of the book that this view is
in accordance with the understanding of the Murji- theologians, headed
by Ibn Shabb and Ibn al-Rawand (chap. 10 and 11), but it contradicts
the Arab grammarians and the Mu,tazil theologians (chap. 4, Sbawayh
and Farra-; chap. 9, Abu 'l-Hudhayl and Naz.z.am).
However, two dierent interpretations of the assertoric statement have
been transmitted from the logic tradition of Late Antiquity. According to
the understanding of Theophrast, the \absolute premise" (al-muqaddama
al-mut.laqa/protasis. . . tou uparchein) is open to the specications \possi-
ble" or \necessary." According to Alexander, it is open to the specication
regarding the special time in which the judgment is actual (p. 29).
If we compare the ancient interpretations referred to with the Murji-
objections to Was.il b. ,At.a-'s \Position between the two positions" (man-
zila bayna 'l-manzilatayn), we can understand why the translators of
Aristotle have translated protasis...tou uparchein as al-muqaddama al-
mut.laqa. Mut.laq or ,ala 'l-it.laq, literally \detached/unbound" renders in
the Aristotelic translations and commentaries aplo^s (simple, simpliciter),
that is \detached" (abolutus) from any determination, from time and
modus. Already the Murji- theologian Abu Shamir (end of the 2/8th
c.) used mut.laq in the meaning of \detached/unbound/unlimited" (pp.
29{30), e.g. fasiq mut.laq (\unrestrained/simple transgressor"; p. 155).
Chap. 3 (pp. 31{78) is devoted to the extensional interpretation of the
general terms (Allgemeinbegrie) by ,Amr b. ,Ubayd (d. ca. 144/761) and
Was.il (d. 131/748). The interpretation of the article al - as a quanticator
(all-quanticator), which shows the universal extension of the determined
term (e:g. al-fujjar, or al-fajir) goes back to ,Amr b. ,Ubayd. For him
the validity of the wa,d verses is general: \the singular and the plural
of a noun connected with the article denotes a collective, which includes
all those who are denoted by the same name" (p. 428). Therefore God's
wa,d is a \promise of punishment" for all transgessors of the law. With
the exception of Abu Hashim (al-Jubba-, d. 321/933) (pp. 276{84), the
Mu,tazil theologians have followed him. Was.il, in his refutation of the
argumentation of ,Amr, <<understood those sentences as a consequence
from the second of the rst>> (p. 429): from the \evildoers" follows \in
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hell," and from \whoever hath done evil and his sin surroundeth him"
follows \such are owners of the Fire." These sentences are valid without
ambiguity (they are muh. kam) and must not be interpreted.
In the study of the positions of the grammarians (Sbawayh, Zajjaj,
Farra-) (chap. 4, pp. 79{88), Schock shows that they understand verses like
Qur-an 2:81 as conditional sentences, in other words implications (luzum).
According to Sbawayh and the Mu,tazil Abu 'l-Hudhayl, the conse-
quent (apodosis/jawab/jaza-/tal) follows necessarily from the antecedent
(protasis/shart./muqaddam). In \As for the thief, both male and female,
cut o (fa-qt.a,u) their hands" (5:38), he converts the denite nomen agen-
tis (al-sariq/al-sariqa) into a conditional protasis (\when/if somebody
steals)" (p. 83). Conditional here is equivalent to an all-quantication
and to a modus of necessity. This understanding of the sentence or this
propositional logic (G. Aussagelogik) is not above all a product of the
Arab grammarians of the 2/8th c., but preceded it in the discussion on
the salvation status of the sinners (p. 88).
Under the title \Early controversies about the limitation of the pro-
mise of recompense and the threat of punishment (al-wa,d wa-'l-wa,d)"
(chap. 5, pp. 89{103), Schock scrutinizes the qualication/limitation (Ein-
schrankung, rendering also the Arabic istithna- \exception") of the Qur-
-anic verses on recompense and punishment. For instance, must Qur-an
4:93: \Whoso (man) slayeth a believer of set purpose, his retribution
(fa-jaza-uhu) is hell. . . ," be linked with 4:48: \God forgiveth not that a
partner should be ascribed unto Him (an yushraka bihi). He forgiveth
save that (ma duna dhalika) to whom He will."?
Or in 2:191: \And slay them (i.e. the polytheists of Mecca) wherever
ye nd them [...]. Temptation (tna) is worse than slaughter." Early
exegetes understood the phrase \temptation is worse than slaughter" to
mean that polytheism is worse than slaughter, and linking it with 4:48,
they concluded that God forgives slaughter to whom he will. The contro-
versies on those matters go back to the generation of the Companions.
These issues are documented in a well known controversy between al-
H. arith b. ,Umayra, a pupil of the Companion Mu,adh b. Jabal (d. ca.
17/638) and Ibn Mas,ud (d. 32/652 or 33/653) on the verses of promise
(recompense) (pp. 90{91; for the translation see Gilliot, Exegese, langue
et theologie en islam. L'exegese coranique de Tabari [Paris, 1990], p.
216) concerning the relation between \I am a believer" and \(I am) in
Paradise." Ibn Mas,ud and his pupils champion an understanding of the
sentence which corresponds to the comprehension of Sbawayh, about 150
years later, which is called in Latin: posito antecedente ponitur consequens
(shart./antecedens, jaza-/consequens). It seems that Ibn Mas,ud takes up
the extreme Murji- position, which will be that of Muqatil b. Sulayman
(d. 150/767): faith \weighs" more than a transgression (sq).
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But a question remained: how can a \believer" be dened? Here
Schock studies the well known \formula of exception/limitation/Einsch-
rankung/ istithna-" of Sufyan al-Thawr (d. 161/778): \I am a believer,
if God will," which is to be put into relation with Qur-an 4:48: \God
forgiveth not that a partner sould be ascribed unto Him. He forgiveth
save that to whom He will (li-man yasha-u)." The limitation of \I am a
believer" has a corresponding rule in the Latin Middle Ages: modus tol-
lendo tollens: a disjunctive syllogism, \mode which, by taking away, af-
rms," i.e. \by annihilating the consequent, the antecedent is annihilated"
(perempto consequente perimitur antecedens), that is by taking away \in
Paradise," \believer" is taken away. He whom God does not forgive his
misdoings is not in Paradise and so is not a believer, because the name
(ism, i.e. believer) is necessarily followed by \in Paradise" (p. 97).
The solution of the problem of the relation between promise of recom-
pense (wa,d) and \transgressions of the duties" (dhunub) by the limitation
(istithna-) of the name \believer" with the formula of exception could not
seriously compete with the solutions of Was.il and Abu H. anfa, but it pre-
vailed in the circles of the traditionists (muh. addithun) and, thanks to Ibn
H. anbal, entered the Ash,ar school.
Schock also studies the position of Quraysh b. Anas al-Ans.ar (d.
209/824) on the limitation of the verses of punishment. To him the general
promise of punishment in Qur-an 4:93 is limited by 4:48. This last verse
became an important H. anaf-Murji- proof for the limitation (istithna-)
of the universality of the punishment verses (pp. 98{101). Abu ,Amr b.
al-,Ala-, on the other hand, limited these verses on the basis of God's
generosity (karam) and grace (fad. l), quoting in support of his view not
a Qur-anic verse, but ancient poetry (pp. 102{103). It should be noticed
that \generosity" remains in H. anaf theology a notion parallel to \grace."
Mu,tazil prosopographers claim that Was.il was the originator of kalam
or of Mu,tazil logic (pp. 67, 104). For Sha, the initiator of this theology
was Abu H. anfa (p. 104; see van Ess, TG, I, p. 191, with ref., n. 4). This
means that Was.il and Abu H. anfa are representatives of the two schools
of thought (Denkrichtungen) between which the Islamic controversial the-
ology develops. In the oldest extant H. anaf documents the denitional
apprehension of faith, and the quantication and modalization of state-
ment and imperative are constitutive elements of Abu H. anfa's teaching.
This is the reason why chap. 6 (pp. 104{118) deals with Abu H. anfa's
understanding of these matters.
For Abu H. anfa, acknowledgement (iqrar) and faith (man) are not
an act, but an attribute (s. ifa) which is \acquired like a possession or a
specic quality" (p. 106). Faith is a permanent quality and belongs to
the subject of faith as an intrinsic quality (wesenhafte Eigenschaft). In
the H. anaf understanding it is a name (ism), which, like genre, species,
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dierence, belongs to whom it belongs in the same way (p. 107). This
understanding of faith is reminiscent of Aristotle's unity of denition. For
Porphyrios also non-augmenting and non-decreasing is a distinguishing
mark (attribute) of the denitional (p. 105).
Another important point in the view of Abu H. anfa is the distinction
he made between genre or species as a whole and the general/generic con-
cept (Gattungsbegri ) or specic concept (Artbegri ), as a presupposition
of the \specication of the general." (p. 112). The name \(the) pig" des-
ignates indeed all the pigs as denotata (musammayat) of the concept, but
does not necessarily mean so in a statement \all pigs," if the statement
is not explicitly (universally) quantied. The form of nearer determina-
tion by an explanation/explicitation (tafsr), specication (takhs.s.) and
limitation (taqyd) was applied by Abu H. anfa not only to subjects or
predicates in a statement, but also to imperatives, as in Qur-an 5:38: \As
for the thief [...], cut o their hands." This sentence is both true and
false: true for some of the thieves, not true for others. The interpretation
species the meaning of the absolute (mut.laq) expression \the thief" (p.
113).
We can remark that here, like in an example of Theophrast (Phanias
possesses knowledge/Phanias does not possess knowledge), the principle
of the excluded third is overruled.
In chap. 7 (pp. 119{151), Schock presents the doctrine of judgment in
al-Mant.iq of ,Abd Allah b. al-Muqaa, (d. after 139/756) or of his son
Muh.ammad with the following questions: Had the translation of Greek
terms into Arabic an inuence on this theological debate? How does this
work deal with quantication and modalisation of the statements? Does
this paraphrase of the Organon bear a reference to the conict between
Mu,tazils and Murji-s on the intermediate position (\Position between
the two positions") and the interpretation of the verses of punishment?
Chap. 7 (pp. 152{179) is entirely devoted to the distinction between
names (asma-) and qualications (aws.af ) in the conict around the in-
termediate position.
In the second half of the 2/8th c., the Murji- H. anaf Abu Shamir
(van Ess, TG, II, pp. 174{180, and passim) and Abu Mu,adh al-Tuman
(TG, II, pp. 737{738) put Abu Mu,adh among the theologians whose
assignment is uncertain. Like Abu Shamir, Abu Mu,adh was a Qadar;
he thought in the categories of the Mu,tazil ethics of retribution, but
he still did it under Murji- prognostic. Abu Shamir and Abu Mu,adh
were conscious of the weak point of Was.il's doctrine of the postion/status
of the \wicked/transgressor" (fasiq) between \believer" and \unbeliever"
(see pp. 43{53, under the title: \Die Paronymie des Namen `Frevler' (ism
al-fasiq)").
The name fasiq, an active participle (nomen agentis), which is de-
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rived from actions, should be the name of the agent after the action was
complete (pp. 151{155, 435). Abu Shamir raised the issue on a logi-
cal level, distinguishing between an absolute (mut.laq/,ala 'l-it.laq/aplo^s
/simpliciter ; cf. Sophistici elenchi, 4, 166b 16sqq./K. al-Sust.iqa) and
unrestricted predication on the one hand, and a predication in regard to
something (f kadha/ pe^/secundum quid) (pp. 155{157, 435), on the other
hand. Abu Mu,adh, remaining on the grammatical level, distinguished be-
tween names (asma-), independent of actions and not limited in time, and
qualications (aws.af ), which can only be predicated of a subject limited
in time (pp. 158{161, 435).
Under pressure, the Mu,tazils distinguished between belief in God in
connection with actions of obedience and belief in God without connec-
tion with actions of obedience (pp. 162{167, 435). So ,Abbad b. Sulayman
(d. after 260/874), and after him Abu ,Al al-Jubba- (d. 303/916), dis-
tinguished between the name (ism) and the verbal qualication (was. f ).
According to Abu ,Al the transgressor/wicked (fasiq) can only be quali-
ed with the verb \he believes/he has believed" (related to time), but he
cannot be named absolutely/simply (mut.laq) with the nomen \believer"
(p. 164).
However, after this, the Mu,tazils established a distinction between
grammatical names (linguistic predication) and class names (class predi-
cation) (pp. 167{172, 435). Whereas \the names of the language" (asma-
al-lugha) last only for the duration of the act, and consequently for the
duration of the interlacing of the act and the quality of the act, or, that is
to say, the virtue (khas. la), the \names of religion" (asma- al-dn) subsist
until the completion of the act. This was the solution of Abu ,Al, which
was still modied by Ka,b (d. 319/931).
Chap. 9 (pp. 180{228) deals with the universality and necessity of
judgments according to the doctrine of Abu 'l-Hudhayl (d. ca. 227/841),
al-Naz.z.am (d. before 232/847) and their successors.
In Chap. 10 (pp. 230{239), Schock explains the interpretation of the
wa,d verses by Muh.ammad b. Shabb (died in the thirties of the 3rd/mid-
dle of the 9th c.), who, with Ibn Rawand, is the most important opponent
of the Mu,tazil understanding of the \general." Ibn Shabb's and Ibn
Rawand's understanding of these verses is in accordance with the Peri-
patetic term-logic. An unquantied statement/judgment with a universal
(,amm/kull) subject term is indenite (muhmal). Among the Murji-s,
Ibn Shabb is the most consistent about the indetermination of the wa,d
verses. According to Abu Shamir and Ibn Shabb, a wa,d verse is not
only undetermined with regard to quantity, but also with respect to the
occurrence of the expressed facts. According to that, \whoever (man)
hath done evil and his sin surroundeth him; such are rightful owners of
the Fire; they will abide therein" (2:81) should be understood in the fol-
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lowing ways:
[a] \all or some who have done evil and their sin surrounds them, such
are possibly owners of the Fire."
[b] \all or some who are possibly owners of the Fire, will possibly abide
therein." (p. 235).
But referring to 82:14 \The evildoers (fujjar) are in hell," he saw two
types of fujjar :
[a] The evildoers, who are not Muslims, [necessary as modus ponendo
ponens] will be in hell.
[b] The evildoers, who are among Muslims, [possibly as possibile ad
utrumlibet ; according to Fakhr al-Dn al-Raz: al-wa,d... ,ala na,t al-
dawam am la, ad Qur-an 2:82] will be in hell.
Both Ibn Shabb and Ibn al-Rawand were instrumental in the suc-
cess of the Murji- doctrine, and the following chap. 11 \The quantica-
tion of the statement, Ibn al-Rawand and the Murji-a" (pp. 240{271)
is devoted to Ibn al-Rawand. It is not impossible that his K. al-khas.s.
wa-'l-,amm and K. al-waqf (uber die epoche? i.e. wuquf, abstention of
judgment/assensionis retentio) could have been the same work (van Ess,
TG, VI, p. 434, op. 24, 25, 28, seems to have another opinion on the
relationship between the titles). In the parts of this chapter devoted
to \those who do not decide" (arbab al-waqf, or al-waqiyya) those who
practice the assensionis retentio concerning the decision whether Qur-anic
verses which begin with an indenite pronoun (ism mubham), with a uni-
versal/general noun (ism ,amm) connected with an article and governed
with inna, or verses which begin with a noun which is grammatically a
general expression (lafz. ,amm), have a general or a specic (khas.s.) mean-
ing (pp. 259{64). Baghdad named under their representatives Ash,ar
and Ibn al-Rawand; Ghazal and Amid named Ash,ar and Baqillan (p.
259).
In chap. 12 (pp. 272{295), we nd also doxographic reports of Nash
al-Akbar (d. 293/906) on the concept of possibility.
The most important reversal of opinion from the Mu,tazil to the
Aristotelian-Murji- way of thinking can be observed in the generation
of the pupils of Abu ,Al al-Jubba- (d. 303/916). We know the controver-
sies between the latter and Ash,ar (d. 324/935). But the debates between
the master and his son Abu Hashim al-Jubba- (d. 321/933) are not less
important (chap. 13, pp. 276{284). Abu Hashim made a distinction be-
tween genre as a whole, the concept of genre and the syllogism contained
in the judgment.
Farab's (d. 339/950) commentaries on the De interpretatione or on
the Analytica priora contain very few allusions to his concrete opponents,
but we can understand that he was opposed to the Mu,tazil doctrines as
regards the points which concern this study (chap. 14, pp. 283{372). Af-
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ter Ibn al-Muqaa,, he dealt with the distinction between the articulation
of a statement and the facts of the case indicated by the statement (pp.
411, 427). He made this distinction in confrontation with the Arab gram-
marians. The expression (lexis/lafz.) corresponds to a matter (ule/madda)
(pp. 137{141, according to Ibn al-Muqaa,), but the grammatically cor-
rect composition (sumploke/ta-lf ) of the expression in a sentence is not
necessary adequate to the materia. To be comprehensible on the basis
of its articulation in speech, a sentence must be unambiguous with re-
gard to quality (pp. 300{305), quantity (pp. 314{320) and mode (pp. 18{
30). Farab explains well the dierence between material contrariety, i.e.
contrariety (enantiotes/tad. add), and linguistic articulated contrariety, i.e.
contradiction (antiphasis/tanaqud. ). For example, from the sentence: \the
evildoers will be in hell" it cannot be concluded that some or all sinners
will be in hell. Whether the facts of the case are possible or necessary can
only be understood if the sentence contains a modal word.
For Ash,ar also, then Baqillan (d. 403/1013) and Maturd (d. 333/
944) arguing against \position between the two positions," \believer/ be-
lieving" and \transgressor" (fasiq) are not contradictory (chap. 15, pp.
373{381). The argumentation of Maturd and Baqillan serves to clarify
its Aristotelian origin (p. 375).
,Abd al-Jabbar (d. 415/1025) wants above all to demonstrate the un-
ambiguity of the Qur-an (chap. 16, pp. 383{393). His understanding of
denonimation by the linguistic expression (dall al-lafz.) has a correspon-
dence/equivalence in the Stoic conception (pp. 386{387).
In chap. 16 (pp. 394{408), Schock presents the conception of the quan-
tication of the conditional premises by Avicenna (d. 428/1037). Accord-
ing to Farab and Avicenna the conjunction (ittis.al) of antecedent (pro-
tasis) and consequence (apodosis) in such sentences like Qur-an 2:81 is as
undetermined as the relation between subject term and predicate term in
Qur-an 82:14. They correspond with regards to quantication and mode
to the indenite, assertoric, categoric judgment. This understanding, as
Schock has demonstrated, is in accordance with that of the Murji- the-
ologians, rst of all Ibn Shabb and Ibn Rawand.
Summing up the evolution of the debates between theologians, gram-
marians and logicians, Schock remarks:
When _Gazzal nally, at the end of a process of increasing con-
sciousness of the dierence between grammatical articulation
and abstract idea, distinguished between a general name (ism
,amm) and a universal concept (ma,na kull) the Mu,tazil
doctrine had already approached the end of its decline. Only
in the eld of grammar could a Mu,tazil still be an authority.
However, Sunn doctrine and Arab grammar were never fully
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harmonized. Therefore in Qur-anic exegesis the gap between
Sbawayh's understanding of sentences as implications and the
term-logical understanding was not closed. From the gram-
matical standpoint the revelation is understood according to
Sbawayh's `propositional logic', and from the standpoint of
dogmatics the revelation is understood according to the Mur-
gi- doctrine and Aristotelian term-logic (p. 437).
This has also consequences for the translation of some passages of the
Qur-an, e.g. 2:81 and 82:14. It was \obvious" for a medieval logician that
such sentences are indenite statements, \as it seems to be obvious for a
modern reader that these sentences are implications" (p. 438).
There are very few errors in this book (p. 437, read \Sunde", not
\Snde"). The two indexes (Arabic words and terms, pp. 451{464; per-
sons and groups, pp. 465{468) are very useful.
We regret that Schock has not suciently taken into consideration the
Kharij views (only pp. 32, 43, 45, 259; and p. 8: Ibad.). She could, for
instance, have consulted the Qur-anic commentary of the Ibad. Hud b.
Muh.kim, e.g. for her p. 95, on \completeness (istikmal) of faith" (see
Gilliot, \Le Commentaire coranique de Hud b. Muh.akkam/Muh.kim,"
Arabica 44 (1997): 179{233: p. 184 akmilu, p. 185 al-mustakmilun, p.
186 ikmal, p. 190 etc., with the references to the commentary itself); but
also for the interpretation of Qur-an 2:81, 5:38, 9:5, 82:14, etc.
In writing his opus magnum, Josef van Ess did not want \to smooth the
way for loudmouths (Sprucheklopfern sollte der Weg nicht geebnet wer-
den). But we could wish for an expansion of the scholarly dialogue in the
eld [of Islamic theology]" (van Ess, TG, I, p. XI; cf. Gilliot, \Une lecon
magistrale d'orientalisme: l'Opus magnum de Josef van Ess," Arabica XL
(1993/3): 345{402, esp. p. 352).
Without the work of van Ess, this excellent study of Schock would not
have been possible. However, in spite of its unavoidably analytical nature,
it is an outstanding original synthesis of theology, Qur-anic exegesis, logic
and grammar in Islam through a fundamental \case-study." Schock has
succeeded in making clear the logic of theologians, exegetes, logicians and
grammarians on essential issues. We hope that this important work will
soon be translated into Arabic.
Claude Gilliot
Universite de Provence
